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Multi-level innovation policy in southern EU countries. 








The present paper aims to analyse the innovation policies implemented in Italy and Spain. It adopts a multi-level 
perspective to investigate the effects induced by regional and national public supports and a multi-dimensional 
approach to disentangle the different types of additionality impacts on firms’ innovation process. In particular 
input, output and behavioural additionality are considered. The results, obtained through a propensity score 
matching estimation of the average treatment effect on treated (ATT) implemented on CIS 4 microdata, capture 
a  complex  picture.  In  both  the  countries  only  national  policies  increase  R&D  investment.  As  for  output 
additionality,  whereas  Spanish  regional  and  national  policies  enhance  the  economic  exploitation  of  new 
products and patent applications, Italian interventions boost only process innovation. As for the behavioural 
additionality, mixed evidences emerge for regional Italian policies, for which some negative effects are also 
found, Italian national interventions positively affect interactions with other firms and research partners, Spanish 
policies (both national and regional) induce funded firms to engage in formal training and to interact more with 
business and research partners. A tentative analysis of the “risk of policy failure” is also provided. Apart from 
Italian regional policies, for which no significant result is found, the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients 
reveal that the (rank of the) ATT calculated for each additionality measure is negatively related to the (rank of 
the) corresponding coefficient of variation. High ATTs are thus correlated with low dispersions.   
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Two contrasting forces characterise innovation policy particularly in southern EU countries. Whereas 
the support to innovation activities is a necessary condition to reach the objectives of the “Europe 
2020”  strategy,  the  ongoing  economic  crisis  is  pressuring  governments  to  reduce  their  direct 
intervention  in  support  of  the  economic  systems,  or  at  least  to  increase  the  effectiveness  and 
efficiency of the policy actions. In this framework the contribution to the policy-learning process 
coming from the evaluation of the innovation policy is of particular importance, as the information on 
the effectiveness of previous interventions allows for a better shaping of future policy objectives and 
means.  
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the impacts of the innovation policy 
interventions by focusing on two southern EU countries, namely Italy and Spain. To analyse the 
multi-level systems of policy of the two countries, the paper is focused on the public supports initiated 
both at the regional and national level. More specifically, the aim of this work is twofold. At first, it 
aims to provide an evaluation of the additionality of the policy interventions, by analysing the net 
effects that would not have occurred in absence of the public support. In doing this three dimensions 
of the additionality are considered. In addition to the standard input and output additionality, which 
assess  whether  the  policy  has  been  able  to  overcome  the  underinvestment  in  R&D  and  the 
underproduction of innovation generated by the likely presence of market failures (Arrow, 1962), an 
analysis  of  the  behavioural  additionality  is  also  provided.  This  latter,  whose  concept  has  been 
developed upon the seminal contribution by Buisseret et al. (1995), is focused on the strategic and 
behavioural changes induced by the public intervention and can assess whether the policy action has 
been  able  to  overcome  or  mitigate  the  presence  of  potential  system  failures  (e.g.  Smith,  2000; 
Metcalfe, 2005; Malerba, 2009). With this respect, in the paper, an analysis of the effect of the policy 
on the networking activities and on the learning process of the beneficiaries is provided.  
The second main aim of this work lies in the tentative analysis of the “risk of failure” of the 
policy. Whereas the majority of the contributions to the empirical literature on the evaluation of the 
innovation policy deal with the average effect of the public intervention, it is quite unclear whether an 
higher effect is associated to a higher or lower dispersion of the impact across the beneficiaries.  
The analysis provided is based on microdata on manufacturing firms coming from the fourth 
wave (2002-2004) of the Community Innovation Survey, which allows for a comparison across the 
two countries. To deal with the likely presence of selection bias, the additionality evaluaton is carried 
out with by employing a set of propensity score matching algorithms. The analysis of the “risk of 
failure” of the policies is based upon the Spearman’s rank correlation between the coefficients of 
variation of the effects, calculated for each additionality measure considered, and the corresponding 
levels of (normalised) average impact. 
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. After this brief introduction Section 2 deals  
with the theoretical and empirical background. This provides in particular a review of the additionality 
concept and of the empirical contributions aimed at evaluating innovation policies implemented in 
Italy and Spain. The third section presents the econometric approach, the characteristics of the dataset 
and of the variables. Section 4 reports the results of the additionality evaluation and of the analysis of 
the “risk of policy failure” for the regional and national innovation policy implemented in Spain and 




 2. Theoretical and empirical background 
2.1 The additionality of innovation policy 
The concept of additionality, in its input dimension, dates back to the standard neoclassical approach 
to the innovation policy (Arrow, 1962), according to which the presence of market failures (i.e. non-
perfect  appropriability,  uncertainty,  indivisibility  and  increasing  returns)  creates  a  systematic 
mismatch between private and public incentives to innovate and a consequent underinvestment in 
innovation activities. This implies that innovation policy interventions should be aimed at stimulating 
an additional amount of private investment in R&D in order to reach the social optimum. In this 
perspective input additionality is concerned with whether the additional R&D investment activated by 
the policy is higher than the subsidy received  (Cerulli, 2010) or, more generally, with the amount of 
resources and innovative inputs (i.e. R&D investment) that would not have been allocated without the 
policy (Georghiou, 2002; 2004; Clarysse et al. 2004).  
The neoclassical approach is not concerned only with the optimal level of investment in R&D, 
as  an  underinvestment  in  R&D,  due  to  the  strict  linear  relation  between  inputs  and  outputs,  is 
expected to generate an underproduction of innovation. Hence, innovation policy interventions are 
eventually aimed at increasing the amount of innovation outputs produced by private actors. In this 
sense the output dimension of the additionality concept is focused on the amount of outputs that 
would not have been achieved without the policy intervention (Georghiou, 2002; 2004; Georghiou 
and Clarysse, 2006). Several types of output can be considered in such an analysis, however, in a 
microeconomic perspective, the focus can be on the immediate results of the innovation projects 
supported by the public intervention (e.g. new products or processes and patents) and their economic 
outcomes (e.g. improved business performances as resulting from the introduction of new products or 
processes) (Georghiou, 2002).  
Although  quite  straightforward  both  the  input  and  output  dimensions  of  the  additionality 
concept are affected by some limitations arising from their anchorage to the standard neoclassical 
rationale. In particular, considering the beneficiary as a “black-box”, they fail to take into account the 
complexity of the innovation process and the organisational, behavioural and strategic impacts of the 
public support (Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006). To overcome this limit the behavioural dimension of 
the additionality has been developed in the literature: this is defined by Buisseret et al. (1995), in their 
seminal contribution, as “the change in a company's way of undertaking R&D which can be attributed 
to  policy  actions"  (p.  590).  Even  if  the  behavioural  additionality  is  still  vaguely  defined  in  the 
literature,  it  is  particularly  useful  for  capturing  three  types  of  changes  induced  by  the  policy 
intervention.  First,  the  acquisition  and  improvement  of  knowledge,  capabilities,  organisational 
routines and strategies (Georghiou and Clarysse, 2006; Breschi et al., 2009). A second type of effect 
that can be analysed using the concept of behavioural additionality is the impact on the beneficiaries' 
networking  and interactions with other organisations (Georghiou, 2004; Fier et al., 2006; Georghiou 
and Clarysse, 2006; Hall and Maffioli, 2008; Breschi et al. 2009). Finally, as noted by Geoghiou 
(2004), Bach and Matt (2005)  and Georghiou and Clarysse (2006), focusing on the acquisition of 
competences in new or extended technologies, on the creation of novelty and capacity to adapt to 
future situations, it is also possible to assess whether a given policy intervention has been able to 
overcome lock-ins into non-preferable technologies. The analysis of this types of effects allows for 
the concept of behavioural additionality to be consistent with the evolutionary theorizing and the 
system of innovation approach, according to which the policy rationale has to be found in the system 
failures (e.g. Smith, 2000; Metcalfe, 2005; Malerba, 2009) rather than in the market failures. More 
precisely, the behavioural additionality evaluation can be used to assess the effectiveness of the policy 4 
 
interventions aimed at overcoming the system failures that occur at the level of the beneficiaries, as 
the natural unit of analysis of the additionality evaluation is the firm or the organisation supported by 
the policy.  
 
2.2 Empirical literature on the additionality of Italian and Spanish policies 
Several studies investigate the additionality of the Italian and Spanish policies aimed at supporting 
firms’ innovation activities.  
Cefis and Evangelista (2007) analyse the impact on Italian firms’ expenditure in innovation 
activities  of  policies  initiated  at  different  levels  (i.e.  local  or  regional,  national  and  European). 
Adopting an OLS control function approach on CIS3 (1998-2000) data, their findings point to a 
positive input additionality effect of the local and national policies and of the supporting interventions 
framed within the European Framework Programme. Some output additionality impacts also emerges 
for the interventions included in the European Framework Programme and, to a lesser extent, for sub-
national policies. To reduce potential endogeneity problems Cefis and Evangelista (2007), merging 
CIS2 (1994-1996) and CIS3, analyse the effect of a lagged policy support (considering together the 
different levels of intervention). An additional effect is found only on the firms’ total  expenditure in 
innovation activities. This positive results is not confirmed when using as outcome variables the 
variation rate of the additionality measures considered
1.  
More recently Cerulli and Potì (2008), merging the Italian CIS3 with balance sheets data, 
investigate  the  input  additionality  of  innovation  policies  targeted  to  Italian  companies,  not 
distinguishing among the different levels of intervention. The results, obtained from OLS, propensity-
score matching and a Heckman selection model, generally support the presence of input additionality 
(in terms of R&D expenditure, R&D intensity on the turnover and R&D per employee). Some more 
mixed evidences emerge when considering the output additionality in terms of policy effect on the 
turnover due to product innovations. Interestingly, Cerulli and Potì (2008) further disaggregate their 
analysis by macro-region, sector
2 and firm’s size. Their results point to a total crowding-out effect in 
low knowledge-intensive services sector, very small firms (10-19 employees) and auto-vehicle sector.   
Italian policy has been further investigated by works aimed at analysing the impact of specific 
funding mechanisms. Barbieri et al. (2010) investigate the impact of the law 46/82, which consists of 
two parts, establishing the Fund for Applied Research (FSRA) (which converged in 2001 in the Fund 
for Research Support (FAR)) and the Fund for Technological Innovation (FIT) respectively. In brief, 
the  former  is  aimed  at  supporting  firms’  investment  in  applied  research  activities  including  the 
collaborations  with  research  partners,  while  the  latter  is  focused  on  applied  innovations  and  the 
development phase of the firms’ R&D activities. The analysis carried out by Barbieri et al. (2010) is 
based on a panel created upon three waves of the Capitalia (MedioCredito Centrale) surveys (1995-
1997, 1998-2000, 2001-2003). The results emerging from a difference-in-difference approach point to 
an ambiguous evidence on the input additionality of the law 46/82. The only positive and significant 
effects are those emerging from the difference between the second and the first wave analysed. More 
precisely, it is noticeable a positive and significant impact of the first part of the law (FSRA) on the 
R&D expenditure and of the second part of the law (FIT) on the R&D personnel. To control for the 
                                                           
1 Variables capturing the cooperation attitude are also included. In Cefis and Evangelista (2007) a comparison 
with  the  impact  of  regional,  national  and  European  policies  on  Dutch  firms’  innovation  activities  is  also 
provided.  
2 Sectors considered are: high-tech, medium-high tech, medium-low tech manufacturing sectors; knowledge 
intensive and low-knowledge intensive services.  In addition to these, three specific manufacturing sectors are 
considered: i.e. auto-vehicle, mechanics, chemicals. 5 
 
concurring  effects  of  other  incentive  schemes,  Barbieri  et  al.  (2010)  employ  a  difference-in-
difference-in-difference  method.  The  results  point  to  a  lack  of  effectiveness  of  the  law  when 
interacted with other policy schemes.  
Merito  et  al.  (2010)  investigate  FAR’s  predecessor,  i.e.  the  Fund  for  Applied  Research 
(FSRA).  In  particular  the  last  two  years  of  its  activity,  i.e.  1999-2000,  are  considered.  FSRA 
effectiveness is evaluated through a matching approach applied over Amadeus (Bureau va Dijk) data 
merged with information on patenting activities stemming from the Delphion dataset. The focus of the 
work is mainly on the output additionality effects of the FSRA, two (2002) and four years after the 
public  support  (2004).  More  precisely,  the  analysis  aims  at  capturing  the  impact  on  the  market 
success, labour productivity, patenting activity, labour force composition and employment growth. 
The only significant effects (i.e. a positive impact on the patent applications and a negative one on the 
composition of the workforce) are registered in the short-run (2002), while none of the outcome 
variables is found to be significantly affected by the policy support in the medium-long run (2004). 
However, the effect of the intervention seems to be dependent on the type of beneficiaries: when the 
analysis is limited to the SMEs, FSRA is found to be positively affecting the composition of the 
workforce,  the  patenting  activity  (both  in  the  short-  and  medium-long  run)  and  the  employment 
growth (in the medium-long run).  
A more recent study dealing with the evaluation of the FAR is the one by Cerulli and Potì 
(2010),  who  employ  a  panel  covering  the  period  2002-2004  created  upon  data  collected  by  the 
Ministry  of  Research  (MIUR)  and  the  Italian  National  Institute  of  Statistics  (ISTAT).  The 
comprehensive econometric analysis provided sheds, at first, some light on the input additionality 
effects. The evidence emerging from a structural model, in its reduced form regression equation, 
points  to  a  positive  effect  on  private  R&D  spending.  Cerulli  and  Potì  (2010)  also  analyse  the 
heterogeneity of the effects, investigating the presence of input additionality in different subgroups of 
firms. Input additionality is found to characterise large and very large companies, low-tech, high and 
medium-high tech firms, as well as companies located in the North and the Centre of Italy. Another 
interesting insight from Cerulli and Potì (2010) is the analysis of the effect of the input additionality 
on the level of output additionality, captured by the number of patents. Through a matching technique, 
for each firm, an idiosyncratic level of additionality and the “own R&D expenditure” are estimated 
and used as predictors, together with the amount of subsidy, in a poisson regression. The coefficient 
of the idiosyncratic additionality term turns out to be positive and significant, meaning that the input 
additionality  effect  of  the  policy  induces  a  higher  innovation  performance  in  terms  of  patent 
applications
3.  
As far as the FIT is concerned, this is evaluated by De Blasio et al. (2011) with a regression 
discontinuity  design  approach,  which  exploits  a cut-off  in  the  programme  due  to the  unexpected 
shortage of funding in March 2002. The evidence, based on data from the Ministry of Economic 
Development  and  the  Cerved  dataset  of  financial  statements,  points  to  a  substantial  lack  of 
effectiveness: subsidised firms do not invest more in either tangible or intangible assets.  
In addition to the works reviewed above, at the best of our knowledge, the contribution by 
Bronzini and Iachini (2011) is the only one that analyses a specific regional innovation policy. By 
using CERVED balance sheets data and employing a regression discontinuity design approach, based 
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types of intervention within the FAR and for an investigation of the structural differences, concerning also the 
different  economic  performances  (i.e.  productivity,  profitability  and  turnover’s  growth  rate),  between  firms 
performing crowding-out and firms performing additionality.  6 
 
on the cut-off generated by a threshold in the score obtained in the projects’ evaluation process, 
Bronzini and Iachini (2011) assess the input additionality of the regional R&D subsidy implemented 
in the Emilia-Romagna region. This is found to be ineffective in fostering private investment (tangible 
and intangible), the level of employment and labour composition. However, when the analysis is 
carried out by firm’s size, there emerges a positive effect on private investment of small companies.  
Moving to the empirical contributions aimed at evaluating innovation policies in Spain, a first 
work  to  be  mentioned  is  the  early  contribution  by  Busom  (2000),  who  investigates  the  input 
additionality of a programme implemented in 1988 by the Centre for Technological and Industrial 
Development (CDTI), an agency of the Spanish Ministry of Industry. Through OLS regressions, the 
mean  fitted  values  of  the  R&D  expenditure  and  the  R&D  personnel  for  participants  and  non 
participants  are  obtained.  By  comparing  these  values  Busom  (2000)  concludes  that  the  policy 
positively affects both the input additionality measures considered.  
A more recent empirical contribution focused on Spanish public support schemes is the one 
by González and Pazó (2008), who investigate the input additionality of Spanish policies in the period 
1990-1999,  without  distinguishing  among  the  different  levels  of  intervention.  They  employ  a 
matching technique over the panel coming from the Spanish Survey on Firm Strategy. The evidence 
points  to  the  absence  of crowding-out  between  public  and  private  spending.  Furthermore,  public 
funding is found to be a necessary condition for some types of firms (small and operating in low 
technology sectors) to engage in R&D activities.  
By exploiting the same dataset for the period 1998-2005 Garcia-Quevedo and Afcha-Chávez 
(2009) analyse the input additionality of national and regional policy interventions. Policy support 
schemes initiated at the national level positively affect the intensity of R&D investment; however, a 
similar result is not found to be in place for regional interventions, for which the policy impact is not 
significant.  
The last three contributions here reviewed (Busom and Fernández-Ribas, 2008; Magro et al., 
2010; Afcha-Chávez, 2011) introduce some new insights in the literature, as they are focused also on 
the behavioural additionality of innovation policy. The work by Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2008) 
is focused on the cooperation dimension of the behavioural additionality. To evaluate the impact of 
the national funding the work employs data coming from the Spanish Innovation Survey (period 
1996-1998). At first, the authors adopt a structural model, in which the decision to participate in the 
policy is modelled, as well as the equations of partners selection (i.e. on the one hand customers and 
suppliers and, on the other hand, public research organisations). However, after having estimated a 
reduced  form  equations  of  their  structural  model,  Busom  and  Fernández-Ribas  (2008)  turn  to  a 
matching approach
4. The results of the empirical analyses show that the policy has a positive impact 
on the cooperation between funded firms and public research organisations and, to a lesser extent, on 
the interactions between supported companies and private partners.  
Afcha-Chávez (2011) consider the impact of Spanish policies, initiated both at national and 
regional  level,  on  the  cooperation  with  customers  or  suppliers  and  universities  or  technological 
centres. The analysis is carried out on the basis of data coming from the Spanish Survey on Firm 
Strategy (period 1998-2005). As in Busom and Fernandez-Ribas (2008), Afcha-Chávez (2011) tries to 
employ a structural approach, but then moves to a propensity score matching estimation, given the 
endogeneity of the public support. The results point to a positive impact of both regional and national 
policy  on  the  likelihood  to  establish  a  cooperation  with  an  university  or  a  technological  centre. 
Nevertheless,  both  the  regional  and  the  national  programmes  have  no  significant  effect  on  the 
cooperation with customers or suppliers.  
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The last work here reviewed is the one by Magro et al. (2010), which at the best of our 
knowledge  represents  the  only  attempt  to  evaluate  a  specific  Spanish  regional  policy,  namely  a  
programme implemented in the Basque Country. By adopting a matching technique they analyse 
whether  public  funding  rises  the  propensity  to  collaborate,  increases  the  capacity  of  the  firm  to 
participate in international R&D programmes, leads to systematic R&D behaviour within the firms. 
The evidence provided leads to conclude that the policy programme has a positive effect on all the 
three aspects of the behavioural additionality. 
Despite the large of evidence provided, the empirical literature dealing with the effectiveness 
of the policies implemented in Italy and Spain suffers from two main limitations that this paper aims 
to  overcome.  At  first  proper  comparisons  are  not  allowed  due  to  the  differences  in  the  effects 
considered,  data  and  methodologies  employed.  Second,  almost  all  the  contributions  (with  the 
exception of Cerulli and Potì, 2010) analyse the average effect of the participation in the policy, 
without taking into account that even a large and positive average effect can be associated to a high 
risk of dispersion of the impact itself. In other words, whereas the return of the policy is properly 
analyse, no insights on the “risk of failure” of the intervention are provided.  
 
2.3 The multi-level system of policy 
 
In analysing the policies implemented in Italy and Spain this papers adopt a multi-level perspectives 
that  finds  its  theoretical  and  empirical  anchorage  in  recent  contributions  dealing  with  regional 
innovation policy. In the early literature on regional systems of innovation the relevance of intra-
regional or localized relations as major drivers of learning and innovation has led to think that the 
regional  policy-maker  is  in  the  best  position  to  implement  innovation  strategies  focused  on  the 
promotion of networks and cluster-type instruments. Such an increasing attention on the regional level 
of policy has been justified by the idea that public intervention needs to be “context-specific and 
sensitive to local path-dependency” (Amin, 1999, p. 368). However, this perspective fails to take into 
account  the  necessary  inter-connections  between  different  levels  of  government.  Innovation  is  a 
phenomenon  that  occur  at  different  scales  and  it  is  shaped  by  institutional  aspects  that  might 
supersede the regional level and pertain to the national or even supra-national ones (Howells, 1999; 
Boschma, 2005). Due to this, public interventions should be seen as parts of a multi-level system of 
policy or governance (Cooke, 2002; Kaiser, 2003), in which different support schemes are initiated at 
different levels. This perspective seems to be particularly consistent with an evolutionary or system-
kind of approach, in which policies targeting the connectivity of actors within close regional systems 
of innovation are unlikely to be successful because they do not consider the necessary diverse and 
complex  knowledge  to  be  acquired  from  external  sources  that  can  complement  the  regional 
knowledge base (Bathelt et al., 2004; Gertler and Levitte, 2005; Boschma and ter Wal, 2007; Uyarra, 
2010). In this sense it seems that the national or even supra-national levels of government may be in a 
better position to coordinate, to say the least, policy interventions aimed at solving system failures.  
This multi-level analysis seems to be particularly necessary in the case of the two countries 
here analysed in which the national and the regional levels of policies are implemented according to 
different objectives and modalities. Italian policies initiated at the sub-national levels, with respect to 
national ones, are generally characterised by a lower public contribution, being mainly targeted to 
SMEs and aimed at supporting less formalised and process innovation (Cefis and Evangelista, 2007; 
Barbieri et al., 2010). Similarly, also Spanish regional policies are characterised by a smaller scale and 
scope and by a higher attention to less formalised innovation activities  than the national interventions 
(Garcia-Quevedo and Afcha-Chávez, 2009; Afcha-Chávez, 2011). It is important to mention, with this 
respect, the usefulness of the behavioural additionality evaluation, as the standard input (and output) 8 
 
additionality  assessment,  by  analysing  the  formal  engagement  in  (and  the  results  of)  innovation 
activities, might lead to an underestimation of the effects. 
 
3. Empirical application 
3.1 Econometric strategy 
In evaluating the additionality of innovation policies the focus is basically on the net treatment effect 
of the public intervention. In other terms, the objective is to measure the impact that is directly caused 
by a given treatment, in this case the policy. This net effect can be seen as the difference between the 
outcome observable after the treatment and the outcome that would have been observed without the 
treatment, i.e. the counterfactual. Denoting by Yi1 the outcome in case of treatment and by Yi0 the 
outcome in case of non treatment, the effect on a single unit is ∆i= Yi1 – Yi0.  
As noted by Holland (1986), the possibility to use this kind of approach is limited by the 
fundamental problem of causal inference: it is not possible to observe both the outcome in presence 
and in absence of the treatment on the same unit. The statistical solution to this problem is based on 
the concept of average causal effect, and the parameter of interest becomes the average treatment 
effect on treated (ATT):  
) 1 | ( ) 1 | ( ) 1 | ( ) 1 | ( 0 1 0 1 = - = = = - = = D = D Y E D Y E D Y Y D E ATT     (1), 
where D denotes the binary treatment status. While E(Y1| D=1) can be estimated by the mean outcome 
of treated units, E(Y0|D=1) (i.e. the potential outcome in absence of treatment), cannot be observed, as 
it is not possible to detect the outcome that would have been reached in absence of the support for 
treated units. In a situation in which units are randomly assigned to the treatment E(Y0|D=1) could be 
estimated  by  E(Y0|D=0),  because  on  average  treated  and  non  treated  do  not  differ  so  that 
E(Y0|D=1)=E(Y0|D=0). Nevertheless, random assignments are very unlikely in innovation policy, as in 
most of the economic policies. On the one hand, some beneficiaries can self-select themselves, while, 
on the other hand, policy-makers can deliberately select recipients with certain characteristics with 
either a "picking the winner" or  a "aiding the poor" strategy (Cerulli, 2010). The result is that treated 
and non treated units are systematically different; thus, estimating the counterfactual with the mean 
outcome of non participants is a source of bias, namely the selection bias. This can be generated, on 
the one hand, by the omission of observable variables that partly determine both the treatment status 
and  the  outcome  (selection  on  observables).  On  the  other  hand,  selection  bias  can  be  caused by 
unobserved  factors  that  determine  both  the  treatment  status  and  the  outcome  (selection  on 
unobservables) (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). A device to control for the selection on observable is 
the use of matching estimators, which aim at pairing treated units with non treated ones that have the 
same observable characteristics, so that the difference in the outcome variable is only due to the 
treatment.  
At the basis of matching methods there is the conditional independence assumption:  
X D Y Y | , 1 0 ^                    (2)
5  
Accordingly  outcomes  are  independent  of  programme  participation,  conditional  on  a  set  of 
observables characteristics X. Conditioning on X is like assuming that the assignment is randomised 
and that unobservables are not relevant for the participation (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). In order to 
have  a  consistent  matching  procedure  another  assumption  is  needed:  the  so-called  “stable  unit-
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treatment  value  assumption”  or  SUTVA  (Rubin,  1986).  SUTVA  implies  that  the  outcome  for 
individual  i  must  be  independent  to  the  treatment  given  to  individual  j;  this  is  a  very  strong 
assumption in social sciences and in particular in the evaluation of innovation policy due to the likely 
interactions among the units of analysis. In addition to these assumptions, for a correct matching 
estimation of the ATT, the common support condition is also necessary: 
1 ) | 1 Pr( 0 < = < X D                   (3) 
6 
If (3) is not satisfied there are only treated or non treated units for certain X vectors, thus making the 
matching impossible.  
Given (2), SUTVA and (3) it is possible to overcome the inability to observe the potential 
outcome in absence of treatment for the participant units. As E(Y0|D=1,X) = E(Y0| D=0, X),  the 
unobservable term E(Y0|D=1,X), can be recovered from E(Y0| D=0, X). Hence,  
) , 0 | ( ) , 1 | ( 0 1 X D Y E X D Y E ATT = - = =             (4).  
Intuitively matching methods are based on the idea that the effect of treatment is estimated through 
the difference between the mean outcome of participants and the mean outcome of the non treated 
units that the same set of observable characteristics X. Theoretically, in order to have an unbiased 
estimator of the treatment effect, it should be crucial to match a treated unit with a non treated one 
that has exactly the same vector of X. However, if the vector has a high dimension it can be difficult, 
if not impossible, to find appropriate matches for all the treated units. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), 
in their fundamental paper, propose a device which helps to reduce the dimension of conditioning: the 
propensity score. Propensity score is the conditional probability of receiving the treatment given X:   
) | 1 Pr( ) ( X D X P = =                  (5). 
Drawing on Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), when (2) holds, 
) ( | , 1 0 X P D Y Y ^                   (6):  
when  outcomes  are  independent  of  programme  participation  conditional  on  X,  they  are  also 
independent  of  treatment  conditional  on  the  propensity  score.  The  aim  of  the  propensity  score 
matching is to eliminate the dimension of conditioning by pairing treated and non treated units which 
have the same (or very similar) values of P(X), though possible different values of the single Xs. In 
this sense the (4) can be rewritten as: 
)) ( , 0 | ( )) ( , 1 | ( 0 1 X P D Y E X P D Y E ATT = - = =           (7) 
To  operationalise  the  propensity  score  matching  estimation  of  the  ATT,  in the  following 
empirical application a multi-step protocol is applied (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). At first, the 
propensity score is estimated with a probit model that includes as covariates all the variables that are 
expected to affect the outcome and the treatment status.  
Then, as a second step, a set of different algorithms is chosen. In the following empirical 
application the use of more matching procedures provides information on the stability and reliability 
of the emerging evidences. In particular three types of algorithms developed in the literature (e.g. 
Becker and Ichino, 2004; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Smith and Todd, 2005; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
                                                           
6As the interest is on the treatment effect on treated the common support condition can be relaxed and written as 
Pr (D=1|X) <1. This guarantees the presence of suitable counterfactual units for each treated (Smith and Todd, 
2005). 10 
 
2008)  are  implemented:  5  nearest  neighbours  (5NN),  caliper  and  kernel.  To  provide  a  better 
explanation of the different algorithm it is useful to introduce the following general notation (Smith 
and Todd, 2005) for the propensity score matching estimation of the ATT:  
 
                      (8), 
     
with the counterfactual being defined as 
                      (9) 
and where I1 denotes the set of participants, I0 the set of non participants, Sp the region of common 
support (see below) and P(X) for simplicity is P. The match for each participant i  Î I1  Ç  Sp  is 
constructed as a weighted average over the outcomes of non participants, where the weights W(i, j) 
depend on the distance between Pi and Pj. 5NN matching is a variant of the single nearest neighbour 
matching, where the set of control units j selected as matches for each treated i, i.e. C(Pi), is such that: 
                      (10) 
 
More precisely, in the 5NN matching, the counterfactual for each treated unit is given by the mean 
outcome of the five non treated persons with the closest propensity score. With respect to the single 
nearest neighbour procedure, 5NN implies a trade-off between lower variance (more information is 
used to create the counterfactual) and an increased bias in the estimation (some dissimilar non treated 
units can be used as matches). Caliper matching reduces this potential bias by imposing a maximum 
tolerance , e (i.e. 0.02 in the following application), to the distance in the propensity score values 
between treated and non treated units:  
                      (11) 
To  increase  the  possibility  to  find  good  matches  in  both  the  5NN  and  caliper  algorithms  the 
replacement is allowed, i.e. non treated can be matched with more than one treated. The last algorithm 
employed is the kernel matching:  
 
 
                      (12), 
 
where G(·) is a kernel function (i.e. Epanechnikov) and an a bandwith parameter (i.e. 0.06). With 
respect to the other two procedures, which use a limited number of controls for each treated unit, 
kernel matching creates the counterfactual for each participants using the information from all the 
entire set of non treated, thus involving a trade-off between lower variance (more information is used) 
and higher bias (on average the similarity between treated and controls is expected to be lower).   
The third step consists of imposing the common support condition to the matching algorithms. 
In  what  follows  a  "minima-maxima  comparison"  is  applied.  Following  the  psmatch2  STATA 
procedure (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003), treatment observations whose propensity score is higher than 
the maximum or less than the minimum  propensity score of the controls are dropped. In addition to 
this,  a  5%  “trim”  is  also  imposed  to  the  5NN  algorithm;  this  results  in  dropping  treatment 
observations at which the propensity score density of the controls is the lowest. 
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The last step consists of assessing the quality of the matching. The basic idea is to compare 
the situation after and before the matching to check whether any differences in the covariates remain 
after  conditioning  on  the propensity  score.  The  following  theorem  suggested by  Rosenbaum  and 
Rubin (1983) helps to clarify this point: 
) ( | X P D X ^                   (13), 
This implies that after conditioning on P(X), additional conditioning on X should not provide any 
further information on the treatment status. To check the quality of matching four tests are employed. 
The first is a regression-based T-test on differences in the covariates means, for which it is expected 
that after the matching all the covariates are not able to significantly predict the treatment status. The 
second  is  a  loglikelihood  ratio  test,  for  which  after  the  matching  the  covariates  included  in  the 
specification of the probit model for the propensity score estimation are expected to be jointly non 
significant. The third is a pseudo R
2 test. In this case the goodness of fit of the probit model is 
expected to collapse after the matching. The fourth is a test on the standardised bias
7, which is passed 
if after the matching the standardised bias is reduced below 3%-5% (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008)
8.  
Propensity  score  matching  is  not  only  the  basis  for  the  estimation  of  the  ATT,  i.e.  the 
additionality of the public support schemes, but also of the tentative analysis of the “risk of failure” of 
the policies. The basic idea is to analyse whether a high (low) additional effect is characterised also by 
a  high  (low)  level  of  dispersion.  To  this  purpose,  at  first,  i-th  firm’s  effects  are  calculated  by 
subtracting from the value of the outcome variable of each supported firm i the average outcome of its 
counterfactual, obtained with a 5NN procedure. Then, for each additionality measure considered (see 
Section 3.3), a coefficient of variation of these i-th firm’s effects is calculated. Furthermore, to have 
comparable  ATTs  across  the  different  additionality  measures,  normalised  ATTs  are  obtained  by 
dividing each ATT by the overall average counterfactual outcome (i.e. E(Y0| D=0, P(X)) obtained 
from  the  5NN  matching.  Finally,  a  Spearman’s  rank  correlation  coefficient  is  calculated.  This 
captures to what extent the rank of the normalised ATT, calculated for each additionality measure, is 
related to the rank of the corresponding coefficient of variation.   
 
3.2 The Community Innovation Survey 
The following empirical application is carried out by employing data coming from the fourth wave of 
the Community Innovation Survey (CIS4). As all the CIS waves, this is based on an harmonized 
questionnaire which is the same for all the European countries, thus allowing for comparable results. 
In addition to firm's characteristics, the CIS4 dataset includes information on: (i) product and process 
innovations; (ii) innovative inputs and expenditures; (iii) public funding; (iv) sources of information; 
(v)  cooperation  agreements;  (vi)  effects  of  innovation;  (vii)  hampering  factors;  (viii)  intellectual 
propriety rights; (ix) organisational and marketing innovation; (x) effects of organisational innovation. 
The information gathered through the harmonised questionnaire of the CIS4 refers generally to the 
                                                           
7 Standardised bias is calculated both after and before the matching as: 
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X being the mean of the covariates and  ) (X V their variance. 
8 The results of the tests, which are not reported in the following pages but available upon request, largely 
support the quality of all the employed matching procedures. The only slightly non satisfactory test is the one on 
the standardised bias: through all the sixteen matching procedures only for five covariates the SBafter is found to 
be slightly higher (6.1% at the most) than the threshold indicated by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). 12 
 
period 2002-2004, however some of the variables capture particular aspects in the last year of the 
reference period
9 or both in the first and last year
10.  
Eurostat offers the possibility to access to a CIS4 dataset containing anonymised microdata
11. 
The anonymisation of the data eliminates formal identifiers such as the name or exact address of the 
enterprises, while some firm's characteristics (i.e. country of the head-office, sector, size) are recoded 
into less punctual variables. In addition to this, Eurostat micro-aggregates the data. The resulting 
database consists of the same number of units as kept in the original database: artificial units are 
created  by  replacing  original  values  by  the  mean  (for  quantitative  variables) or  mode  value  (for 
qualitative  variables)  within  clusters  of  three  observations
12  formed  of  individuals  of  ‘maximum 
similarity’ (i.e. with the nearest value). The variables in the original dataset are micro-aggregated 
independently of each other (i.e. clusters are established separately for each specific variable). This 
process, as mentioned, does not reduce the number of observations, which is actually quite high.  
More precisely, the dataset used in the following empirical application originally consists of 18,946 
observations for Spain and 21,854 for Italy. Nevertheless, in order to provide a proper additionality 
evaluation  of  the  regional  and  national  policy  interventions  the  size  of  the  working  dataset  is 
reduced
13. That because of three main reasons. At first, the analysis is limited to manufacturing firms. 
Second,  in  order  to  have  the  complete  range  of  variables  for  all  the  observations,  firms  with 
unexpected  missing  values  and  firms  that  had  not  to  fill  the  entire  questionnaire
14  are  dropped. 
Finally, to provide a proper additionality evaluation of the regional (national) policies, the working 
dataset is limited to have among treated units only firms that obtained a regional (national) funding, 




To operationalise the econometric approach presented above, at first, dummy variables that capture 
the firms’ treatment status are needed. To this purpose four dummies on public funding are used. 
These  reflect  whether  the  firm  received  some  funding  by  the  regional  or  local  (FUNLOC),  the 
national (FUNGMT) or the European (FUNEU) levels of government and whether the European 
support was granted within the 5
th or 6
th European Framework Programme for Research and Technical 
Development (FUNRTD). The inclusion of these dummy variables allows for the identification of the 
firms supported by the regional or by the national level of government, but also of the firms that were 
not funded by any type of policy. This, in turn, permits the identification of treated and control groups 
for  the  additionality  evaluation  of  the  regional  and  national  policies  through  propensity  score 
matching.  
Furthermore,  by  using  the  CIS4  database,  it  is  possible  to  use  and  create  a  number  of 
additionality measures, i.e. outcome variables
15, to capture input, output and behavioural additionality. 
                                                           
9  Turnover  due  to  product  innovations  new  to  the  firm  or  to  the  market;  expenditure  for  intramural  and 
extramural R&D; expenditure for machinery, equipment and software; expenditure for external knowledge and 
total expenditure for innovative activities. 
10 Turnover and size 
11  For  16  European  countries  (i.e.  Belgium,  Bulgaria,  Czech  Republic,  Germany,  Estonia,  Spain,  Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia).
 
12 In some cases 4 if the number of records is not a multiple of 3.
 
13 See Section 4 for the actual number of observations used for the ATT evaluation of Italian and Spanish 
regional and national policies.  
14 Those companies that in the period 2002-2004 did not introduce any product or process innovations and did 
not carry out any innovation activities.  
15 Unless differently reported outcome the variables listed below are referred to entire period 2002-2004. 13 
 
As for the input additionality these are: (i) the expenditure in intramural R&D in year 2004 
(RDEXP); (ii) the intensity of the intramural R&D investment (RDINT) on the turnover in year 2004.  
As for the output dimension the considered outcome variables are: (i) a dummy for product 
innovation (PRODINNO); (ii) a dummy for process innovation (PROCINNO); (iii) the percentage of 
turnover in year 2004 due to product innovations introduced in 2002-2004 that were new to the 
market  (TURNMAR);  (iv)  the  percentage  of  turnover  in  year  2004  due  to  product  innovations 
introduced  in  2002-2004  that  were  new  to  the  firm  (TURNIN);  (v)  the  sum  of  TURNIN  and 
TURNMAR (TURNINNO)
16; (vi) a dummy for patent application (PROPAT).  
Concerning the behavioural dimension two types of impact are considered: the effect of the 
policy interventions on the acquisition of competences and on the interactions of the supported firms. 
As  for  the  analysis  of  the  impacts  on  the  acquisition  of  competences  and  capabilities  the  main 
outcome variable is a dummy for the engagement in formal training programmes (TRAINENG). As 
for the effects on interactions, knowledge transfer and networking activities two types of outcome 
variables can be used. First, two dummies capture respectively cooperation agreements with firms 
(COOPFIRM)  and  research  organizations  (COOPORG)
17.  Second,  two  dummies  identify  the 
acquisition of relevant information from other firms (INFOFIRM) and from universities or private 
research institutes (INFOORG)
18.  
To employ the econometric strategy described above, in addition to the outcome variables, it 
is necessary to create suitable covariates X. Drawing on recent studies that evaluate the additionality 
of innovation policy interventions by adopting a propensity score matching approach (e.g. Czarnitki 
and  Licht,  2006;  Aerts  and  Shmidt,  2008;  Busom  and  Fernandez-Ribas,  2008),  a  set  of  firm's 
characteristics are identified and included in the propensity score specification
19 (See Tab. A1 in the 
Appendix).  First  of  all,  a  variable  for  the  logarithm  of  the  turnover  (ln_TURN02)  and the three 
dummies SMALL, MEDIUM and LARGE control for the firm's size. Participation and innovation 
strategies, however, could be affected also by the sector in which the firm operates: on the one hand 
policy intervention might be targeted to specific and strategic industries, on the other hand, firms 
belonging to more advanced sectors could be more able and willing to apply for the public support 
with well-promising projects. A series of dummies (SEC_DA-SEC_DN) capturing the manufacturing 
                                                           
16  TURNMAR TURNIN and TURNINNO are rescaled from 0 to 1. 
17  COOPFIRM  is  “exploded”  in  different  dummies,  capturing  cooperation  agreements  with  national 
(COOPGPNAT) and foreign firms belonging to the same group (COOPGPFOR); national (COOPSUPNAT) 
and foreign suppliers (COOPSUPFOR); national (COOPCUSNAT) and foreign customers (COOPCUSFOR); 
national  (COOPCOMNAT)  and  foreign  competitors  (COOPCOMFOR).  Similarly  COOPORG  is  further 
specified to capture the cooperation with: national (COOPINSNAT) and foreign private R&D institutes and 
commercial  labs  (COOPINSFOR);  national  (COOPUNINAT)  and  foreign  universities  (COOPUNIFOR); 
national  (COOPPUBNAT)  and  foreign  governments  or  public  research  institutes  (COOPPUBFOR).  ATT 
estimation for these specific types of cooperation are provided in the Appendix. 
18 These dummies are created from the four-point likert scales, included in the CIS4 dataset, that indicate the 
importance of different sources of  information for the firm’s innovation activities. The dummies takes value 1 if 
the  relevance  of  the  information  is  “medium”  or  “high”.  INFOFIRM  captures  information  coming  from 
suppliers (INFOSUP), customers (INFOCUS) and competitors (INFOCOM). INFOORG includes information 
sourcing from universities (INFOUNI) and private research institutes (INFOINS). ATT estimations for these 
specific types of information sourcing are provided in the Appendix. 
19  As  the  treatment  dummies  FUNLOC  and  FUNGMT  cover  the  2002-2004  period,  in  order  to  avoid 
endogeneity problems, whenever possible, the propensity scores specification includes variables referred to the 
first year of the period (2002). This can be done ln_TURN02, SMALL, MEDIUM and LARGE. 14 
 
sector  in  which  the  firm  operates  are  thus  included
20.  Furthermore,  aspects  pertaining  to  the 
governance and ownership of the firm are controlled for with the inclusion of two dummies indicating 
respectively whether the firm belongs to a group (GP) and whether it is an affiliate of a multinational 
corporation (MNCGROUP). Whereas belonging to a group might increase the information, available 
through network channels, on existent policy schemes and thus the likelihood of being supported by 
the policy, being a MNC-affiliate might reduce the participation as parent companies might be more 
willing to file subsidy applications in the home country. Another firm's characteristic that is expected 
to affect the probability to participate in the policy programmes and the innovation strategy pertains to 
the  engagement  in  foreign  markets  (EXPORT).  Firms  that  face  the  international  competition  are 
indeed expected to be more aware of the need to innovate and thus probably more willing to apply for 
policy programmes that support their innovative activities. Another important aspect is whether the 
firm is engaged in R&D. For this reason two dummies, RDENG and RDCONT, are included. The 
first captures whether the firm is engaged in R&D, the second whether this engagement is continuous. 
Of course, both of them are expected to have a positive effect on the participation in support schemes, 
as firms that are strongly committed to formal R&D activities are supposed to be more willing and 
able to apply, successfully, for the public funding. Another factor that might influence the innovation 
behaviours and the participation status is the firm's financial constraint. Two set of dummy variables 
are thus included in the probit estimations of the propensity score. The first of these (HFENT1, 
HFENT2, HFENT3) captures whether the firm faces a “nil or low”, “medium” or “high” lack of 
internal funding. Similarly HFOUT1, HFOUT2, HFOUT3, captures whether the firm faces a “nil or 
low”, “medium” or “high” problems in accessing to external funding. In this case, it is expected that, 
at least up to a certain point, the more the firm faces a lack of internal or external funding, the more it 
might  wish  to  be  supported  by  the  policy  in  order  to  compensate  for  the  financial  constraint. 
Differently  from  previous  studies,  this  research  takes  into  consideration  also  some  informational 
aspects for the estimation  of  the  propensity  score. Three    dummies  (SMGT1,  SGMT2,  SGMT3) 
indicate respectively the relevance (“nil or low”, “medium”, “high”) of the governmental sources of 
information  for  the  firm's  innovative  activities.  Obviously,  the  information  acquired  from  the 
government is supposed to positively affect the knowledge about possible support schemes, and, in 
turn, the probability to participate in the policy programmes and to shape the innovation behaviour 
consistently with the desired policy objectives. Similarly, other three dummies indicate the relevance 
of the information coming from professionals and industry associations (SPRO1, SPRO2, SPRO3). 
Professionals and industry associations are indeed expected to play a crucial role in supporting firms 
to gather information about possible public interventions, to file applications for support schemes and 





                                                           
20 Italian firms belonging to NACE rev. 1.1 19 (i.e. secDC in the CIS4 sectoral classification), 20 (belonging to 
sec20-21) and 23 (belonging to secDF-DG) are dropped from the working sample, as for these sectors the 
anonymisation process carried out by the Italian National Statistical Institute resulted in the aggregation of 
medium and large firms into a unique dimensional class. Firms belonging to NACE rev. 1.1 30 (belonging to 
secDL) are drooped as well, as for these the anonymisation process resulted in the aggregation of small, medium 
and large firms into a unique dimensional class. 
21 LARGE, HFENT1, HFOUT1, SGMT1, SPRO1, SEC27 (i.e. NACE rev 1.1 sector 27) are used as reference 
terms, thus are excluded from the probit model for the propensity score estimation.  15 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Italian regional policies 
The  additionality  evaluation  of  the  Italian  regional  policies  is  carried  out  on  a  sample  of  2,006 
manufacturing firms (599 supported and 1,407 potential controls). As it emerges from Tab. 1 regional 
policies  in  Italy,  during  the  considered  period,  are  generally  characterized  by  a  low  level  of 
additionality and in some case they seem to induce negative impacts on the innovation activities of 
supported firms.  
 
Tab. 1 Additionality of regional policies in Italy 
  NN5  CALIPER (0.02)  KERNEL  TRIM (5) 
   ATT  SE  ATT  SE  ATT  SE  ATT  SE 
Input add.                 
RDEXP  42295.320  67483.270  43382.720  67180.760  23791.990  47706.630  45794.740  71086.020 
RDINT  0.003  0.002  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.003  0.002 
Output add.                 
PRODINNO  -0.047 *  0.028  -0.058 **  0.029  -0.050 **  0.023  -0.063 **  0.031 
PROCINNO  0.122 ***  0.031  0.118 ***  0.029  0.111 ***  0.023  0.133 ***  0.033 
TURNMAR  0.002  0.013  -0.003  0.012  -0.002  0.010  0.002  0.013 
TURNIN  -0.021 **  0.010  -0.025 **  0.010  -0.016 *  0.009  -0.022 *  0.012 
TURNINO  -0.019  0.017  -0.028 *  0.016  -0.017  0.013  -0.019  0.015 
PROPAT  -0.023  0.026  -0.019  0.025  -0.007  0.020  -0.021  0.025 
Behavioural add.                 
TRAINENG  -0.046 *  0.025  -0.046 *  0.027  -0.043 *  0.022  -0.052 *  0.027 
COOPFIRM  -0.028  0.020  -0.028  0.018  -0.015  0.013  -0.040 **  0.019 
COOPORG  -0.019  0.016  -0.019  0.016  -0.012  0.013  -0.028 *  0.017 
INFOFIRM  -0.059 ***  0.022  -0.065 ***  0.024  -0.043 **  0.020  -0.065 ***  0.023 
INFOORG  0.097 ***  0.029  0.101 ***  0.028  0.097 ***  0.027  0.095 ***  0.031 
N treat. on support  598  598  598  570 
N treated total  599  599  599  599 
N non treated  1407  1407  1407  1407 
*, **, *** denote respectively a 90%, 95%, 99% level of significance. Standard errors are calculated with a 200-
replication bootstrap procedure.  
At first, it is possible to notice the absence of input additionality. In this case it might be pointed out 
that the low scale of the regional contributions and the focus on less formalised innovation activities 
(Cefis and Evangelista, 2007; Barbieri et al. 2010) hampers the capacity to stimulate an additional 
investment in formal R&D. As for the output additionality, the policies seems to induce a sort of shift 
in  the  type  of  innovation  introduced,  from  product  to  process  innovation.  With  respect  to  non 
supported firms, funded companies are more likely (from +11.1% to 13.3%) to achieve a process 
innovation, but less likely to introduce a new or improved product (from -4.7% to -6.3%). This lower 
propensity is also reflected in the proportion of turnover due to incremental product innovations, 
which  is  found  to  be  negatively  affected  by  the  policy  intervention (from  -1.6%  to  -2.5%). The 
evidence  emerging  from  the  behavioural  additionality  evaluation  confirms  the  general  low 16 
 
performance  of  regional  innovation  policies  in  Italy.  Public  interventions  initiated  by  regional 
governments are found to be unable to sustain firms’ formalized learning process. The likelihood of 
being engaged in formal training programmes is lower for supported firms than for similar non funded 
companies (from -4.3% to -5.2%). Looking at impacts on the networking activities, funded firms are 
generally  not  statistically  different  from  non  funded  companies  with  respect  to  their  general 
engagement  in  cooperation  agreements
22.  Coming  to  the  capacity  of  the  policy  interventions  to 
stimulate firms’ external knowledge sourcing it is possible to notice, on the one hand, a general 
positive impact when the acquisition of information from research organisations is considered (from 
+9.5% to +10.1%); on the other hand, a negative (and smaller in absolute value) impact is found to 
characterise regional policies when information sourcing from other companies is considered (form -
4.3% to -6.5%)
23. 
As it emerges from Tab. A6 in the Appendix, Italian regional policies are not characterised by 
a significant correlation between the effects of the interventions and the dispersion of the impacts. The 
Spearman’s ranks correlation coefficient, even if negative, is not significant. Hence, the rank of the 
ATT  calculated  for  each  additionality  measure  is  not  significantly  correlated  to  the  rank  of 
corresponding coefficient of variation. 
 
4.2 Italian national policies  
As  it  emerges  from  Tab.  2  the  additionality  profile  of  the  interventions  initiated  by  the  central 
government  in  Italy,  emerging  from  an  evaluation  carried  out  on  a  sample  of  1,845  firms  (438 
supported and 1,407 potential controls), is completely different from the one of the regional policies.  
At  first  it  is  possible  to  notice  that  national  Italian  policies  are  characterised  by  input 
additionality effects. Public interventions induce firms to invest an additional amount of resources in 
intramural R&D activities (from + 427,914.1 Euros to + 447,613.6 Euros). This is reflected in an 
increased intensity of R&D investment (from +0.6% to +0.7%). However, the increased amount of 
formal  inputs  allocated  to  innovation  activities  does  not  result  in  a  higher  capacity  to  introduce 
product and/or radical innovation. In fact, despite a positive effect on the propensity to introduce new 
or improved processes is (from +8.3% to + 9.6%) no significant effect, in the considered period, is 
found to be in place for the other output additionality measures. Nevertheless, such a result might be 
only due to the limited time span of the analysis, positive output additionality effect might indeed 
emerge in a longer-term, especially considering the positive effects of the policy interventions on the 
firms’ innovation beahviour. In particular, national policies are found to affect firms’ propensity to 
engage in R&D cooperation with both other firms (from +4.9% to +5.2%) and, to a larger extent, with 
research partners (from +10.3% to 11.6%)
24. This latter type of effect is associated to an in increased 
propensity to be engaged in relevant information sourcing from universities and private R&D institute 
(from +10.8% to +11.3%)
25.  
 
                                                           
22 Funded companies are found to be less likely to be engaged in collaboration with national competitors (see 
Tab. A2 in the Appendix).  
23 Looking at the different types of information sourcing (see Tab. A2 in the Appendix) it is possible to notice a 
positive impact on the acquisition of relevant knowledge from private R&D institutes and commercial labs, 
while a negative impact is found for the acquisition of information from universities and suppliers. 
24  As it emerges from Tab. A3 in the Appendix, Italian national policies increase the propensity to cooperate  
with  national  and  global  suppliers,  national  private  R&D  institutes  and  commercial  labs  and  national 
universities. 
25 See Tab. A3 in the Appendix for a detail. 17 
 
Tab. 2 Additionality of national policy in Italy 
*, **, *** denote respectively a 90%, 95%, 99% level of significance. Standard errors are calculated with a 200-
replication bootstrap procedure.  
This  picture  on  the  Italian  national  policies emerging  from  the  evaluation  of the  ATT is 
associated  to  an  interesting  relation  between  the  effects  of  the  policies  and  their  dispersion.  A 
Spearman’s rank’s correlation coefficient of -0.8462, significant at the 99% level (See Tab A5 in the 
Appendix), reflects a situation in which a high ATT is correlated to a low dispersion of the effect. In 
this sense national policy interventions in Italy are characterised by a “low risk of policy failure”.  
 
4.3  Spanish regional policies 
 
Tab. 3 reports the results of the additionality evaluation of the regional policies implemented in Spain, 
which is carried out on a sample of 4,110 firms (879 supported and 3,231 potential controls). As far as 
the input additionality is concerned, like in the case of Italian policies initiated at the regional level, no 
significant effect is found to be in place, probably because of the low scale of the contribution granted 
by the regional governments and the greater focus on less formalised innovation activities (Garcia-
Quevedo  and  Afcha-Chávez,  2009;  Afcha-Chávez,  2011).  However,  considering  output  and  in 
particular behavioural additionality, the range of the effects induced by Spanish regional interventions 
is broader than the one of Italian regional policies. Despite the absence of impacts on the allocation of 
formal innovation input, Spanish regional support schemes are characterised by a positive effect (even 
if slightly significant) on the probability to introduce product innovations (from +3.8% to +3.9%) and, 
in particular, by an impact on the capacity to exploit the introduced radical product innovations, i.e. to 
increase the percentage of turnover due to this type of innovations (from + 1.5%  to +1.8%). This 
higher  innovation  performance  is  coupled  with  a  positive  effect  on  the  propensity  to  file  patent 
NN5  CALIPER (0.02)  KERNEL  TRIM (5) 
   ATT  SE  ATT  SE  ATT  SE  ATT  SE 
Input add.                 
RDEXP  429066.1 *  238670.7  427914.1 *  228623.0  447613.6 **  218544.8  313001  261069.2 
RDINT  0.007 **  0.003  0.007 **  0.003  0.006 **  0.003  0.007 **  0.003 
Output add.                 
PRODINNO  0.004  0.034  0.005  0.034  0.006  0.025  0.000  0.033 
PROCINNO  0.086 **  0.036  0.086 **  0.035  0.096 ***  0.027  0.083 **  0.037 
TURNMAR  -0.002  0.013  -0.001  0.015  -0.005  0.010  -0.002  0.013 
TURNIN  0.016  0.012  0.016  0.014  0.013  0.011  0.015  0.012 
TURNINO  0.014  0.018  0.014  0.017  0.007  0.014  0.013  0.018 
PROPAT  0.047  0.030  0.048  0.031  0.061 ***  0.024  0.041  0.030 
Behavioural add.                 
TRAINENG  0.007  0.032  0.005  0.033  0.010  0.029  -0.002  0.032 
COOPFIRM  0.051 **  0.026  0.050 *  0.026  0.052 ***  0.019  0.049 **  0.023 
COOPORG  0.104 ***  0.027  0.103 ***  0.025  0.116 ***  0.022  0.108 ***  0.024 
INFOFIRM  -0.010  0.025  -0.009  0.027  -0.015  0.022  -0.014  0.026 
INFOORG  0.113 ***  0.035  0.112 ***  0.036  0.108 ***  0.027  0.111 ***  0.038 
N treat. on support  433  433  433  417 
N treated total  438  438  438  438 
N non treated  1407  1407  1407  1407 18 
 
applications (from +6.0% to +7.2%). As for the behavioural additionality, Spanish regional policies 
are  found  to  induce  a  large  set  of  changes  in  supported  companies,  both  with  respect  to  the 
improvement  of  the  learning  process  and  the  increased  interactions  with  external  sources  of 
knowledge. More precisely, it can be noticed a positive impact on the engagement in formal training 
programmes  (from  +4.8%  to  +6.1%).  Moreover,  policy  supports  are  found  to  enhance  firms’ 
propensity to cooperate with both other firms (from +7.3% to +7.5%) and research organizations 
(from +9.6% to +10.3%)
26. Looking at the results pertaining to the external information sourcing it is 
noticeable how regional policies in Spain stimulate funded firms to acquire relevant knowledge from 
research organizations (from +10.5% to 12.1%) but not from other firms
27.  
Finally, as for the Italian national policy interventions, also the Spanish regional ones are 
characterised by a “low risk of policy failure”. A Spearman’s rank’s correlation coefficient of -0.6593, 
significant at the 95% level (see Tab A5 in the Appendix), denotes a negative relation between the 
ATTs and the dispersion of the impacts.  
 
 
Tab. 3 Additionality of regional policy in Spain 
NN5  CALIPER (0.02)  KERNEL  TRIM (5) 
   ATT  SE  ATT  SE  ATT  SE  ATT  SE 
Input add. 
RDEXP  -5305.556  34001.730  -5352.441  34923.640  17351.620  20613.090  -7059.569  35644.120 
RDINT  0.154  0.151  0.154  0.147  0.156  0.139  0.161  0.147 
Output add. 
PRODINNO  0.038 *  0.022  0.039 *  0.023  0.039 *  0.021  0.038  0.025 
PROCINNO  0.022  0.023  0.023  0.025  0.042 **  0.019  0.023  0.026 
TURNMAR  0.017 *  0.009  0.017 *  0.009  0.015 **  0.007  0.018 **  0.008 
TURNIN  0.002  0.014  0.001  0.013  0.001  0.011  -0.001  0.013 
TURNINO  0.019  0.016  0.019  0.014  0.016  0.013  0.017  0.015 
PROPAT  0.068 ***  0.020  0.068 ***  0.020  0.060 ***  0.016  0.072 ***  0.021 
Behavioural add. 
TRAINENG  0.048 **  0.023  0.048 **  0.022  0.061 ***  0.018  0.048 **  0.024 
COOPFIRM  0.073 ***  0.021  0.075 ***  0.020  0.073 ***  0.015  0.073 ***  0.019 
COOPORG  0.099 ***  0.018  0.099 ***  0.016  0.103 ***  0.013  0.096 ***  0.017 
INFOFIRM  0.019  0.018  0.021  0.020  0.020  0.013  0.017  0.020 
INFOORG  0.105 ***  0.021  0.105 ***  0.022  0.121 ***  0.019  0.115 ***  0.023 
N treat. on support  876  874  876  836 
N treated total  879  879  879  879 
N non treated  3231  3231  3231  3231 
*, **, *** denote respectively a 90%, 95%, 99% level of significance. Standard errors are calculated with a 200-
replication bootstrap procedure.  
 
                                                           
26 A positive and significant effect is found for the cooperation with national firms belonging to the same group 
to, national suppliers and national competitors. As for the cooperation with research partners, a positive effect is 
found for the collaboration with national private R&D institutes, national universities and national government 
or public research agencies (See Tab. A4 in Appendix). 
27 In particular from private R&D institute and universities (See Tab. A4 in the Appendix). 19 
 
 4.4 Spanish national policies 
The results of the additionality evaluation presented in Tab. 4 pertain to policies implemented by the 
central government in Spain. In this case the sample is made of 3,795 firms (564 treated and 3,231 
potential controls).  
 
Tab. 4 Additionality of national policies in Spain 
 
NN5  CALIPER (0.02)  KERNEL  TRIM (5) 
   ATT  SE  ATT  SE  ATT  SE  ATT  SE 
Input add.                 
RDEXP  367677.1 **  162523.3  371922.7 **  164501.7  359347.8 ***  132797.8  354036.2 **  156419.1 
RDINT  0.071  0.049  0.072  0.046  0.075  0.054  0.074  0.050 
Output add.                 
PRODINNO  0.001  0.027  0.001  0.028  0.014  0.022  0.015  0.030 
PROCINNO  0.022  0.030  0.026  0.028  0.037  0.023  0.012  0.029 
TURNMAR  0.037 ***  0.011  0.038 ***  0.012  0.040 ***  0.010  0.040 ***  0.011 
TURNIN  -0.013  0.015  -0.012  0.016  -0.018  0.013  -0.009  0.015 
TURNINO  0.024  0.019  0.026  0.018  0.022  0.015  0.032 *  0.019 
PROPAT  0.059 **  0.025  0.062 ***  0.023  0.064 ***  0.020  0.073 ***  0.025 
Behavioural add.                 
TRAINENG  0.060 **  0.030  0.061 **  0.031  0.051 **  0.026  0.060 *  0.032 
COOPFIRM  0.086 ***  0.026  0.086 ***  0.029  0.081 ***  0.020  0.081 ***  0.025 
COOPORG  0.111 ***  0.021  0.113 ***  0.023  0.110 ***  0.019  0.105 ***  0.023 
INFOFIRM  0.061 ***  0.024  0.061 ***  0.023  0.050 ***  0.018  0.070 ***  0.024 
INFOORG  0.100 ***  0.026  0.100 ***  0.028  0.116 ***  0.021  0.101 ***  0.028 
N treat. on support  564  564  564  536 
N treated total  564  564  564  564 
N non treated  3231  3231  3231  3231 
*, **, *** denote respectively a 90%, 95%, 99% level of significance. Standard errors are calculated with a 200-
replication bootstrap procedure.  
Like in the Italian case, input additionality effects are found to be in place only when the national 
interventions are considered. In the case of Spain, policy supports stimulate an additional investment 
in intramural R&D (from + 354,036.2 Euros to + 371,922.7 Euros), however a similar positive effect 
is not found for the intensity of R&D investment. As for the output additionality, the effects are quite 
similar to those characterising the policies initiated at the regional level. Spanish national policies 
enhance  the  capacity  to  exploit  the  introduced  radical  product  innovations,  i.e.  to  increase  the 
percentage of turnover due to this type of innovations (from +3.7% to +4.0%), and the propensity to 
file patent applications (from + 5.9% to +7.3%). In addition to this, a number of behavioural changes 
in the supported firms’ innovation process are found to be induced by the public support. At first, 
funded firms are more likely to be engaged in training programmes  (from +5.1% to +6.0%). Looking 
at the impacts on the interactions of the funded companies, national policies enhance the propensity to 
cooperate with both research organizations (from +10.5% to +11.3%) and other firms (from +8.1% to 20 
 
+8.6%)
28. This increased propensity to interact with business and research partners is associated to an 
effect on the capacity of funded firms to acquire relevant information from both other firms (from 
+5.0% to +7.0%) and research organizations (from +10.0% to +11.6%)
29.  
Also in the case of the national interventions implemented in Spain the “risk of policy failure” 
is low. More precisely a Spearman’s rank’s correlation coefficient of -0.6099, significant at the 95% 
level, (See Tab. A5, in the Appendix) denotes that the higher is the ATT, the lower is its dispersion.   
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Through the paper an analysis of the policy implemented in two southern EU countries has 
been provided. This has been carried out through an evaluation of the additionality and of the “risk of 
policy failure” characterising the interventions implemented in Italy and Spain. In doing this, a multi-
dimensional approach and a multi-level perspective have been adopted. This has allowed for the 
investigation of the input, output and behavioural additionality of public interventions implemented 
both at the regional and national levels. The evidence emerging from the propensity score matching 
algorithms implemented to estimate the ATT on the selected additionality measures has allowed for 
the identification of the overall effectiveness of the policies considered. Among the others, some 
interesting results are worth of mentioning in these concluding remarks. At first, both in Italy and in 
Spain, regional policies are not characterised by input additionality effects. This seems to be coherent 
with the characteristics of interventions initiated at the sub-national level in the two countries: a low 
amount of public contribution and a greater focus on less formalised types of innovation activities. 
However, whereas in Spain the lack of input additionality of the regional policies is associated to a 
good performance in the other additionality dimensions, this is not the case for the Italian regional 
interventions, which are characterised by a general weak effectiveness. The reason for such a result 
deserves a deeper investigation, which has necessarily to consider the heterogeneity of the regional 
policies, and thus of their effects, and the fact that the period considered in this analysis (2002-2004) 
is only immediately subsequent to the reform of the Italian constitution, approved in 2001, which gave 
to regions a greater autonomy in terms of industrial policy. Another interesting aspect emerged in the 
analysis pertains to the substantial differences between the output additionality of  Italian and Spanish 
policies. Whereas the former are characterised only by the capacity to stimulate process innovation, 
the  latter  are  found  to  be  able  to  enhance  the  economic  exploitation  of  the  radical  innovation 
introduced as well as patent applications. In this sense the Italian multi-level system of policy does not 
seem  to  be  able  to  trigger  a  quality  leap  in  the  performances  of  the  overall  national  system  of 
innovation.  Whether  the  positive  effects  induced  by  the  Italian  national  interventions  on  the 
innovation behaviours can affect in the long-run the capacity to introduce qualitatively advanced 
innovations is a question which remains open to further investigations. A third aspect which emerged 
through the paper is the spectrum of effects induced by the public support schemes on the innovation 
behaviours of the beneficiaries. Apart from the Italian regional supports, policies are found to induce 
                                                           
28 From Tab. A5  in the Appendix, it is possible to notice an increase in the propensity to cooperate with national 
firms  in  the  same  group,  national  suppliers,  national  and  foreign  competitors.  As  for  the  cooperation  with 
research organizations, national policies increase in particular the propensity to cooperate with national private 
R&D institutes and national universities. 
29  Funded  firms  are  induced  to  recur  to  information  sourcing  from  customers,  private  R&D  institutes  and 
universities (See Tab. A5 in the Appendix). 
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funded firms to interact more with other companies and research organisations. In addition to this 
Spanish policies, both regional and national, are found to increase the engagement of firms in formal 
training programmes.  
The paper has provided also a tentative analysis of the “risk of policy failure”. From the 
analysis  of  the  Spearman’s  rank  correlation  coefficients,  with  the  only  exception  of  the  Italian 
regional policy, the rank of the (normalized) ATTs is found to be negatively related to rank of the 
coefficients of variation. In other terms, the lower is the dispersion of the effects the higher is the 
ATT. Of course this evidence cannot point to general policy implications in absence of other similar 
studies that can extend the external validity of such a result.  
The work is not free from limitations. The most important one is due to the cross-sectional 
nature  of  the  data.  This  hampered  the  possibility  to  overcome  the  potential  endogeneity  of  the 
participation  in  the  policy.  The  availability  of  panel  data  would  improve  the  robustness  of  the 
additionality evaluation by allowing clearer and more rigorous considerations on the causal relations.  






















Tab. A1 Probit estimation of the propensity scores 
FUNLOC – Italy  FUNGMT – Italy  FUNLOC – Spain  FUNGMT – Spain  
   Coeff.  S.E.   Coeff.  S.E.   Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.   S.E.  
SMALL  0.185  0.159  -0.234  0.164  0.535 ***  0.101  -0.325 ***  0.095 
MEDIUM  0.330 ***  0.123  -0.119  0.116  0.381 ***  0.096  -0.271 ***  0.086 
lnTURN02  -0.029  0.034  0.066 *  0.038  0.009  0.006  -0.018 ***  0.006 
GP  -0.250 ***  0.085  -0.002  0.088  -0.008  0.064  0.288 ***  0.067 
MNC  -0.295 **  0.125  -0.346 ***  0.116  -0.203 **  0.093  -0.419 ***  0.093 
EXPORT  -0.005  0.075  -0.004  0.088  0.011  0.055  0.053  0.070 
RDENG  0.125  0.082  -0.035  0.096  0.215 ***  0.065  0.280 ***  0.086 
RDCONT  0.295 ***  0.077  0.397 ***  0.089  0.069  0.063  0.357 ***  0.076 
HFENT2  0.036  0.083  0.079  0.091  0.147 **  0.063  -0.014  0.072 
HFENT3  0.083  0.100  -0.148  0.117  0.057  0.073  -0.079  0.087 
HFOUT2  0.104  0.085  0.196 **  0.094  0.076  0.063  0.074  0.074 
HFOUT3  -0.311 ***  0.099  -0.059  0.111  -0.035  0.071  -0.037  0.086 
SPRO2  0.255 ***  0.085  0.106  0.093  0.116  0.060  -0.062  0.073 
SPRO3  0.551 ***  0.134  0.117  0.159  -0.069  0.116  0.077  0.126 
SGMT2  -0.056  0.192  0.667 ***  0.161  0.374 ***  0.093  0.496 ***  0.100 
SGMT3  0.294  0.249  0.148  0.271  0.702 ***  0.197  0.576 ***  0.218 
CONST.  -0.346  0.640  -1.603 **  0.715  -1.494 ***  0.194  -1.174 ***  0.219 
Sectoral 
dummies   Included  Included  Included   Included 
N  2006  1845  4110  3795 
Prob>χ
2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R
2  0.059  0.077  0.039  0.098 












Tab A2. Behavioural additionlity effects on  firms’ interactions. Italian regional policies 
  NN5  CALIPER (0.02)  KERNEL  TRIM (5) 
   ATT  SE  ATT  SE  ATT  SE  ATT  SE 
COOPGPNAT  -0.010  0.008  -0.010  0.008  -0.009  0.006  -0.013  0.008 
COOPGPFOR  0.001  0.005  0.001  0.005  0.000  0.004  0.001  0.005 
COOPSUPNAT  -0.016  0.016  -0.016  0.015  -0.005  0.013  -0.024  0.017 
COOPSUPFOR  0.001  0.004  0.001  0.004  0.000  0.003  0.001  0.003 
COOPCUSNAT  -0.021  0.014  -0.021 *  0.012  -0.011  0.009  -0.027 **  0.011 
COOPCUSFOR  -0.008  0.007  -0.008  0.008  -0.005  0.007  -0.010  0.008 
COOPCOMNAT  -0.026 **  0.012  -0.026 **  0.010  -0.012  0.009  -0.031 ***  0.011 
COOPCOMFOR  -0.001  0.006  -0.001  0.006  0.000  0.005  -0.001  0.006 
COOPINSNAT  -0.010  0.014  -0.010  0.014  -0.005  0.012  -0.017  0.014 
COOPINSFOR  0.003  0.004  0.003  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.004 
COOPUNINAT  -0.013  0.012  -0.013  0.012  -0.012  0.010  -0.018  0.013 
COOPUNIFOR  0.001  0.004  0.001  0.004  0.001  0.003  0.001  0.004 
COOPPUBNAT  -0.004  0.006  -0.004  0.005  -0.004  0.004  -0.006  0.005 
COOPPUBFOR  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.003 
INFOSUP  -0.053 *  0.030  -0.059 *  0.030  -0.041 *  0.024  -0.053 *  0.030 
INFOCUS  -0.005  0.031  0.000  0.034  0.008  0.027  -0.010  0.033 
INFOCOM  -0.009  0.028  -0.004  0.031  0.008  0.025  -0.020  0.030 
INFOINS  0.114 ***  0.029  0.119 ***  0.030  0.116 ***  0.024  0.118 ***  0.029 
INFOUNI  -0.039 **  0.019  -0.038 **  0.019  -0.033 **  0.013  -0.040 **  0.017 
N treat. on support  598  598  598  570 
N treated total  599  599  599  599 
N non treated  1407  1407  1407  1407 
*, **, *** denote respectively a 90%, 95%, 99% level of significance. Standard errors are calculated with a 200-












Tab A3. Behavioural additionlity effects on  firms’ interactions. Italian national policies 
NN5  CALIPER (0.02)  KERNEL  TRIM (5) 
   ATT  SE  ATT  SE  ATT  SE  ATT  SE 
COOPGPNAT  0.012  0.014  0.012  0.015  0.013  0.013  0.010  0.015 
COOPGPFOR  0.001  0.009  0.001  0.010  0.004  0.009  -0.003  0.009 
COOPSUPNAT  0.046 **  0.020  0.045 **  0.023  0.049 ***  0.018  0.046 **  0.023 
COOPSUPFOR  0.014 **  0.007  0.014 **  0.007  0.013 *  0.007  0.012 *  0.007 
COOPCUSNAT  0.017  0.017  0.016  0.017  0.022  0.014  0.015  0.016 
COOPCUSFOR  0.010  0.013  0.010  0.013  0.013  0.011  0.005  0.011 
COOPCOMNAT  0.011  0.014  0.010  0.015  0.009  0.012  0.014  0.014 
COOPCOMFOR  -0.004  0.007  -0.004  0.007  -0.003  0.006  -0.007  0.007 
COOPINSNAT  0.072 ***  0.024  0.070 ***  0.021  0.081 ***  0.020  0.076 ***  0.022 
COOPINSFOR  0.008  0.007  0.008  0.007  0.008  0.006  0.006  0.008 
COOPUNINAT  0.093 ***  0.025  0.093 ***  0.023  0.103 ***  0.021  0.096 ***  0.023 
COOPUNIFOR  0.001  0.006  0.001  0.005  0.002  0.005  0.001  0.006 
COOPPUBNAT  0.018  0.012  0.017  0.012  0.017 *  0.010  0.020 *  0.011 
COOPPUBFOR  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.001  -0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001 
INFOSUP  -0.005  0.034  -0.004  0.034  -0.007  0.027  -0.004  0.035 
INFOCUS  0.028  0.033  0.028  0.032  0.019  0.030  0.036  0.034 
INFOCOM  0.006  0.033  0.004  0.033  0.003  0.029  0.016  0.032 
INFOINS  0.100 ***  0.034  0.099 ***  0.033  0.094 ***  0.028  0.111 ***  0.037 
INFOUNI  0.063 **  0.026  0.062 **  0.027  0.070 ***  0.021  0.059 **  0.027 
N treat. on support  433  433  433  417 
N treated total  438  438  438  438 
N non treated  1407  1407  1407  1407 
*, **, *** denote respectively a 90%, 95%, 99% level of significance. Standard errors are calculated with a 200-













Tab A4. Behavioural additionlity effects on  firms’ interactions. Spanish regional policies 
NN5  CALIPER (0.02)  KERNEL  TRIM (5) 
   ATT  SE  ATT  SE  ATT  SE  ATT  SE 
COOPGPNAT  0.018 **  0.009  0.019 **  0.008  0.016 **  0.007  0.018 **  0.008 
COOPGPFOR  -0.002  0.006  -0.002  0.007  -0.002  0.005  -0.002  0.007 
COOPSUPNAT  0.039 ***  0.014  0.041 ***  0.015  0.041 ***  0.012  0.037 **  0.015 
COOPSUPFOR  0.008  0.009  0.008  0.009  0.008  0.008  0.007  0.010 
COOPCUSNAT  0.011  0.012  0.012  0.011  0.012  0.009  0.012  0.011 
COOPCUSFOR  0.003  0.008  0.003  0.007  0.004  0.006  0.000  0.008 
COOPCOMNAT  0.016 *  0.009  0.018 *  0.010  0.018 **  0.008  0.019 **  0.009 
COOPCOMFOR  0.003  0.005  0.003  0.004  0.001  0.004  0.003  0.005 
COOPINSNAT  0.053 ***  0.012  0.053 ***  0.013  0.053 ***  0.011  0.052 ***  0.012 
COOPINSFOR  0.009 *  0.005  0.010 *  0.005  0.008 *  0.005  0.008  0.005 
COOPUNINAT  0.057 ***  0.013  0.058 ***  0.014  0.061 ***  0.012  0.055 ***  0.013 
COOPUNIFOR  -0.001  0.003  -0.001  0.002  -0.001  0.002  -0.001  0.003 
COOPPUBNAT  0.016 **  0.007  0.015 **  0.006  0.014 **  0.006  0.014 **  0.007 
COOPPUBFOR  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001 
INFOSUP  0.013  0.023  0.014  0.024  0.022  0.018  0.012  0.024 
INFOCUS  0.027  0.024  0.029  0.023  0.026  0.019  0.027  0.024 
INFOCOM  0.010  0.022  0.012  0.024  0.001  0.016  0.009  0.025 
INFOINS  0.052 **  0.020  0.053 **  0.021  0.065 ***  0.018  0.062 ***  0.020 
INFOUNI  0.055 ***  0.016  0.056 ***  0.017  0.065 ***  0.015  0.062 ***  0.017 
N treat. on support  876  874  876  836 
N treated total  879  879  879  879 
N non treated  3231  3231  3231  3231 
*, **, *** denote respectively a 90%, 95%, 99% level of significance. Standard errors are calculated with a 200-












Tab A5. Behavioural additionlity effects on  firms’ interactions. Spanish national policies 
 
NN5  CALIPER (0.02)  KERNEL  TRIM (5) 
   ATT  SE  ATT  SE  ATT  SE  ATT  SE 
COOPGPNAT  0.029 **  0.014  0.029 *  0.015  0.026 **  0.012  0.023  0.014 
COOPGPFOR  0.012  0.013  0.012  0.014  0.010  0.010  0.013  0.013 
COOPSUPNAT  0.059 ***  0.020  0.059 ***  0.019  0.052 **  0.017  0.057 ***  0.018 
COOPSUPFOR  0.013  0.015  0.013  0.014  0.014  0.012  0.010  0.014 
COOPCUSNAT  0.025  0.016  0.025  0.017  0.016  0.014  0.028  0.017 
COOPCUSFOR  0.015  0.013  0.015  0.013  0.012  0.010  0.010  0.011 
COOPCOMNAT  0.029 **  0.013  0.029 **  0.012  0.026 **  0.010  0.027 **  0.011 
COOPCOMFOR  0.022 **  0.009  0.022 **  0.010  0.021 ***  0.007  0.022 **  0.010 
COOPINSNAT  0.053 ***  0.017  0.053 ***  0.019  0.054 ***  0.015  0.048 ***  0.016 
COOPINSFOR  0.016 *  0.009  0.016  0.010  0.015 *  0.008  0.008  0.009 
COOPUNINAT  0.086 ***  0.021  0.088 ***  0.020  0.090 ***  0.017  0.082 ***  0.019 
COOPUNIFOR  0.004  0.005  0.004  0.006  0.004  0.005  0.002  0.005 
COOPPUBNAT  0.020 *  0.011  0.020 *  0.010  0.020 **  0.010  0.015  0.010 
COOPPUBFOR  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.003  0.001  0.002  0.000  0.002 
INFOSUP  0.054 *  0.028  0.057  0.029  0.035  0.022  0.056 *  0.030 
INFOCUS  0.058 **  0.028  0.062 **  0.027  0.054 **  0.023  0.064 **  0.034 
INFOCOM  0.041  0.027  0.036  0.030  0.025  0.023  0.035  0.029 
INFOINS  0.055 **  0.024  0.055 **  0.026  0.059 ***  0.022  0.059 **  0.028 
INFOUNI  0.075 ***  0.024  0.079 ***  0.022  0.088 ***  0.020  0.068 ***  0.026 
N treat. on support  564  564  564  536 
N treated total  564  564  564  564 
N non treated  3231  3231  3231  3231 
*, **, *** denote respectively a 90%, 95%, 99% level of significance. Standard errors are calculated with a 200-
replication bootstrap procedure.  
 
 
Tab. A6. Spearmans’ rank correlation coefficients (on the main set of additionality measures) 
Policy level and country  Spearman's rho  Prob>|t|  N additionality measures 
Italian regional policies  -0.2527  0.4048  13 
Italian national policies  -0.8462***  0.0003  13 
Spanish regional policies  -0.6593**  0.0142  13 






Tab A7. Spearmans’ rank correlation coefficients (including specific types of cooperation and 
information sourcing) 
Policy level and country  Spearman's rho  Prob>|t|  N additionality measures 
Italian regional policies  0.1373  0.4536  32 
Italian national policies  -0.7232***  0.0000  32 
Spanish regional policies  -0.5876***  0.0004  32 
Spanish national policies  -0.3845**  0.0298  32 
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